Consumer choice often involves a comparison among the available alternatives. Recent research finds that features shared by alternatives are canceled and greater weight is placed on the unique features in choosing among the alternatives provided. Building on this research, the authors propose that the attractiveness of the choice set can be enhanced or reduced by aitering which features appear unique. In the first study, this proposition is tested for choice probiems in which subjects choose or delay choice between pairs of alternatives that have either shared bad features and unique good features (unique good pairs) or unique bad features and shared good features (unique bad pairs). As predicted, a greater percentage of subjects chose an alternative when there were unique good pairs than when there were unique bad pairs. A second study allowed subjects to switch from their initial choice to a new alternative with both unique good and unique bad features. The likelihood of switching to a new alternative was greater for subjects who made the initial choice from unique bad pairs. A third study used the choice context to increase the attractiveness of a specific alternative by making its good features appear unique. Finally, another study used thinkaloud protocols to gain insights into the underlying mechanism.
W hen faced with a choice among several alternatives, an effective understanding of consumer behavior requires an analysis of whether choice occurs, as well as the relative preference among various alternatives. Many formal analyses that examine forced choice assume that features common to all the alternatives in the choice set are canceled in the process of choice (Tversky 1972) . Although the relative preference for an alternative should not depend on whether its features are shared or unique in the choice context, recent research suggests that the evaluation of an alternative can vary depending on the valence of its unique features (Houston and Sherman 1995) . Given the importance of the unique features in comparative judgments, different choice contexts may highlight different features, and the valence of such features may influence the decision whether to choose as well as the relative preference for a specific alternative.
We examine the effect on consumer preferences of altering the features that are seen as common or unique in a choice set. Specifically, building on the notion of differential focus on unique as opposed to common features, we explore the fact that the uniqueness of certain 193 features in a given context can make the choice set appear more or less attractive depending on whether the good features are unique and the bad features are shared or the bad features are unique and the good features are shared in the alternatives. The effect on the overall evaluations of the items in a choice set should affect the likelihood of a person's making a choice as opposed to choosing neither and waiting to see other options. For example, consider a consumer who is debating between two vacation options, both of which have good and bad features. We propose that the likelihood of not choosing either of the two spots is greater when the good features are shared and the bad features are unique to the two vacation spots than when the good features are unique and the bad features are shared by the two options. This will be true even when the options in the unique bad choice set are objectively as attractive as the options in the unique good choice set.
As the example suggests, we test our proposition by altering the choice set under consideration such that either the good or the bad features are unique and, thus, are seen as central and important. Further, we propose that manipulations of the uniqueness of the good or bad features can infiuence the willingness to switch to a new alternative. Specifically, after an initial choice between two alternatives, subjects will be more likely to switch to a new alternative if the initial choice was between alternatives with unique bad and shared good features as opposed to shared bad and unique good features.
Building on this notion, we show that the focus on the unique features can also alter the relative preference for an alternative when a new option is added to the choice set. In particular, by virtue of the introduction of a new option, an alternative whose good features appear unique and bad features appear common should gain in attractiveness relative to other alternatives in the choice set. The predicted effects could have significant implications for marketers' communication strategies in light of the possibility that both choice shares and the likelihood of choosing at all can be affected by altering the shared and unique features of the alternatives in the choice set. Thus, the major goal of the present article is to extend our understanding of feature distinctiveness on preference and to apply these results by outlining their implementation for an analysis of choice incidence.
THE EFFECT OF THE FOCUS ON UNIQUE FEATURES
Making comparisons is a fundamental psychological process, and many of our judgments of similarity and preference involve comparing options in the set of alternatives that are available. Tversky (1977) proposed a model for the comparisoti process involved iti judgmetits of sitnilarity. This model is based on a feature-matching process in which similarity judgments are assumed to be the result of the linear combination of the shared and distinctive features of the objects being compared. It should be noted that both shared and unique features are relevant for judgments of similarity even though the precise weights may vary on the basis of task instruction. However, features that are common to all the alternatives do not provide diagnostic information for preference judgments, in contrast to judgments of similarity, and are therefore not useful in making a choice among alternatives. Regardless of which item is chosen, the subject will end up with the shared features. Accordingly, subjects may place less emphasis on the common features and focus primarily on the unique features of the paired items.
Although the greater emphasis on unique features may be a reasonable heuristic when subjects must choose between two alternatives (Meyer and Eagle 1982; Tversky 1972) , such a process may lead to systematic deviations in choice incidence when subjects also have the option of not choosing any of the alternatives or the option to switch to a new alternative. In such cases, the absolute or the overall value of an alternative should matter, and this depends on both the shared and the unique features of the item. A decision process that leads to underemphasizing some features will result in a distorted evaluation of the items in the choice set and, thus, a possible tendency to choose or reject the same item depending on which of its features were emphasized.
Traditional research has focused on how consumers choose among available alternatives in a forced-choice task. More recent research has examined consumer decision making when the option of not choosing any of the alternatives is also provided (Dhar forthcoming; Huber and Pinnell 1994; Tversky and Shafir 1992) . The evidence from this body of work indicates that subjects may decide not to purchase if none of the alternatives appear attractive or if subjects are uncertain about their most preferred alternative. If consumers focus mainly on unique features of the alternatives, there are two reasons why the decision to not choose will be greater for a choice set consisting of unique bad pairs than for a choice set made up of unique good pairs.
One reason for the difference in the preference for not choosing occurs because the attractiveness of the same alternative will vary with the context. Consider an alternative that is presented as a part of a unique good pair such that the two objects have unique good features but share their bad features. As indicated by the feature-matching model (Houston, Sherman, and Baker 1989) , the shared (bad) features will be underweighted in the choice process. In addition, the unique (good) features of the two alternatives will receive greater attention. Thus, the alternative is likely to appear attractive. However, the comparison process should produce a different outcome when the very same alternative appears as part of a unique bad pair such that both alternatives share good features and possess unique bad features. In this case, it is the unique bad features that carry greater weight in the choice process. The differential prominence of the good and bad features in the two contexts should result in making the alternative either more or less attractive.
A second reason that choice incidence may differ occurs because of the potential difference in decision difficulty in the two contexts. Recent research suggests that making trade-offs between competing alternatives can arouse confiict, resulting in a tendency to postpone choice (Tversky and Shafir 1992) . Note that if the paired items share bad features, but each possesses unique good features, the decision is framed as a trade-off between good features. In contrast, the same comparison process is framed as a trade-off between bad features when paired items share good features and possess unique bad features. The choice situations that require trade-off among negative features may be potentially more difficult than those that require trade-off amotig positive features. Accordingly, the unique bad choice context may be more likely than the unique good context to result in a preference for not choosing. On the basis of this reasoning, we propose the first hypothesis.
HI: The preference for a no-choice option is greater when subjects are choosing between pairs of comparable alternatives that have unique bad and shared good features than when they choose between pairs that have unique good and shared bad features.
STUDY 1 Method
Procedure. The subjects were 290 students at a northeastern university, and they were each paid $2.00 for their participation. The task involved making decisions in several different choice problems. The cover story stated that the researcher was interested in understanding consumer behavior. Subjects were asked to imagine that they were thinking of making decisions in the categories described. The task instructions emphasized that there were no right answers and that subjects should choose the option that best refiected their response to the situation described. Subjects were told that, as in real choice situations, they also had the option of not choosing either of the alternatives provided. A choice set was then presented, and the subjects had to choose between selecting one of the two options or looking for new alternatives.
The study design was such that the same object was paired with an alternative to create a unique good pair in one case and a unique bad pair in another case. This required a minimum of four choice-set combinations differing in terms of the composition of the choice set. In two of the four choice sets, subjects saw two alternatives with the same good features and different bad features. In the remaining two choice sets, the two alternatives had common bad features and unique good features. Each subject made decisions in four different choice problems: two containing descriptions of unique bad pairs and two containing unique good pairs. The two alternatives in each condition were presented side by side, and the common and unique features were alternated. Subjects were randomly assigned to the four conditions (with 70-75 subjects in each), and the order in which the different problems were reviewed was also randomly determined.
Stimulus Material. Four different problems were used to test the hypothesis. The categories used were objects (apartments, vacation spots) and persons (blind dates, same-sex work partners). Two sets of unique good and bad features were used to construct the stimuli; Gl and G2 are used to denote the set of good features, and B1 and B2 are used to denote the set of bad features. Descriptive feature lists for the person and objects were similar to those used by Houston and Sherman (1995) and had been proved to be relatively equally attractive to the student subjects. Each alternative shared its good but not its bad features with one other description, while sharing its bad but not its good features with another alternative. By pairing each alternative with one other alternative with which it shared some features, four pairs of alternatives were constructed for each choice problem: two unique good pairs and two unique bad pairs. An example of a choice set for the vacation problem is provided in Appendix A.
Results and Discussion
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the preference for a nochoice option would be greater for unique bad pairs. The results are presented in Table 1 and are discussed here for the vacation problem. Consistent with the hypothesis, the percentage of subjects who preferred to look for other vacation spots increased by 14 percent {z= \.l,p < .10). One explanation for the difference in the no-choice share could be that the features of the pair G1-B2 are not as attractive as those of G2-B1. Thus, a replication was done for a second choice pair such that the alternative that previously created the unique good pair now created the unique bad pair and vice versa. If alternative G2-B1 were seen as more attractive than G1-B2, there is a greater likelihood to not choose the alternative in the third column over that in the fourth column. However, the percentage of subjects that selected the no-choice option increased by 29 percent (z = 3.5, p < .01) when subjects saw G2-Bl instead of G1-B2. Further, the percentage of subjects who chose the same alternative (Gl-Bl or G2-B2) was lower when it was a part of unique bad pair. As seen in Table 1 , similar results were obtained for the other three categories. The mean share of the no-choice option increased by 17 percent {z = 5.8, p < .01) when the choice was between unique bad pairs.
An overall test of the hypothesis was conducted across the four categories using a binary logit model. The dependent variable was a 0-1 dummy variable, where 1 denotes that subjects did not choose either of the two alternatives. The independent variables were as follows: (1) a dummy variable UNQGOOD, which had a value of 1 if the unique features were good, and (2) two-way interactions between the feature manipulation and the four product categories. Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient for UNQ-GOOD was highly statistically significant (x^(l) = 22.4, p < .001). The coefficients for the interaction between unique features and category-specific dummies were nonsignificant (p's > .2), indicating that the effect of feature manipulation was similar across product categories.
Study 1 demonstrated that the nature of overlapping features can have a systematic effect on the preference for not choosing from the choice set. Specifically, subjects tended to look for a new alternative when the choice context highlighted the bad features. Note that the individual alternatives of each choice set were similar in attractiveness. As stated previously, the greater tendency not to choose from the unique bad pair could be attributed to an aversion to making trade-offs between negative features or to the perceived lower attractiveness of the two alternatives in that choice context. One way of discriminating between the two alternative explanations would be to look at the willingness to switch to a new alternative after making a choice from a unique good pair or from a unique bad pair.
Study 2 allowed subjects to switch to a new alternative with both unique good and unique bad features after a forced choice between unique good or unique bad pairs.. Although the status quo bias suggests that there is a general tendency to stay with the initial choice, it does not predict a difference between subjects who made an initial choice between unique good pairs and those who chose between unique bad pairs. If the greater preference for the no-choice option when presented with the unique bad pairs in study 1 was due simply to greater difficulty in making trade-offs between negative features, then no specific prediction is made about the decision to switch to a new alternative when presented with unique bad pairs as opposed to unique good pairs.
In contrast, if the differences in not choosing refiected a difference in evaluation of the alternatives because of the focus on unique features, there should be a systematic difference in the postchoice response. If the initial choice is among alternatives comprising unique good pairs, subjects are relatively satisfied with their choice because the chosen options' bad features are underweighted (HoustonŜ herman, and Baker 1991) . If the new alternative has unique good and unique bad features, there is no compelling reason for switching, which results in a tendency to stay with the initial choice. However, if the initial choice is between unique bad pairs, subjects will be relatively dissatisfied with their choice because its bad aspects are prominent. On the basis of this discussion, we propose our second hypothesis. H2: After an initial choice, the preference for switching to a new alternative with both unique good and unique bad features is greater when the initial choice involves unique bad pairs than when the initial choice involves unique good pairs.
STUDY 2 Method
Procedure. The subjects were 290 students at a northeastern university, and they were paid $2.00 for their participation. The task and the instructions were the same as those in study 1. After the initial choice, subjects were told that a new alternative was now available and were asked to state whether they would like to stay with their chosen option or switch to the new alternative.
The same design as in study 1 was used, with two unique good and two unique bad choice sets. In all conditions, the third alternative was identical and had both unique good and unique bad features in relation to the two initial alternatives. Each subject made two decisions for the four choice problems: two problems containing descriptions of unique bad pairs and two problems containing unique good pairs. The first decision involved choosing from the unique good or the unique bad pair. The second decision involved deciding between switching to the new alternative or staying with the status quo. Subjects were randomly assigned to the four conditions (with 70-75 subjects in each). The order in which the different problems wei"e reviewed was also random.
Results and Discussion
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the preference for switching to a new alternative would be greater when the initial choice was between unique bad pairs. The results are presented in Table 2 and are discussed here for the vacation problem. In general, there was a preference to remain with the initial choice, as predicted by the status quo effect (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) . Moreover, consistent with the hypothesis, the mean percentage of subjects who preferred to switch vacation spots was 17 percent higher * For the difference in the switching share reiative to the adjacent pair, p = .10. " For the difference in the switching share reiative to the adjacent pair, p = .01.
(z = 1.9, /? < .10) when presented with the two unique bad pairs rather than the two unique good pairs. As seen in Table 2 , similar results were obtained for the other three categories. The mean switching share to the new alternative across all choice problems for the unique good pairs was 20 percent; it increased to 37 percent when the initial choice was between unique bad pairs (z = 5.9, p < .01). An overall test of the second hypothesis was conducted across the four categories using the same binary logit model as in study 1. Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient for UNQGOOD was highly statistically significant (x^(l) = 20.7, p < .001). The coefficients for the interaction between unique features and category-specific dummies were nonsignificant (p's > .2), indicating that the effect of feature manipulation was similar across product categories.
The results of study 2 are consistent with the notion that subjects focus on the unique features of the alternatives in the choice set. Such a focus leads to a more negative evaluation of items from a unique bad choice set and thus a greater willingness to switch to a new alternative. Further, these results cannot be accounted for by the potential difference in the trade-off difficulty in the two contexts. An alternative explanation for the results may arise when subjects' prior beliefs about the set of potential alternatives are weak relative to the contextual information. In such cases, subjects who saw the unique good pairs may have formed different expectations than subjects who saw the unique bad pairs. Eor instance, subjects who saw the unique bad pairs observed variance in negative attributes and may thus expect to see more negative alternatives in relation to subjects who saw unique good pairs and variance in positive features. Although the different expectations could potentially explain the difference in no-choice option reported in the first study, it would not explain why subjects who saw unique bad pairs were also more likely to switch to the new alternative.
If subjects indeed focus more on unique than on common features during the choice process, such differences should be revealed by think-aloud protocols during decision making. This prediction can be tested by counting the number of thoughts expressed about each alternative as they relate to the common or unique features. In addition, previous research suggests that subjects are more likely to pay attention to negative features (Pratto and John 1991) . Finally, we can compare subjects who do choose between the two alternatives with those who do not choose and prefer to consider a new alternative. Consider subjects faced with unique bad pairs. Among these subjects, those who refuse to choose should mention more thoughts about the unique features than those who do choose one of the two items. On the other hand, for unique good pairs, mentioning more thoughts about the unique features should be associated with a greater tendency to choose. On the basis of this discussion, we formulated our third hypothesis.
H3: Subjects are more likely to mention the unique features of the alternatives in the choice set than the shared features. In addition, nonchoosers are more likely than choosers to mention the unique features when choosing from unique bad pairs. Choosers are more likely than nonchoosers to mention the unique features when choosing from unique good pairs.
STUDY 3 Method
Procedure. The subjects were 40 undergraduate students at a northeastern university, and they were each paid $5.00 for their participation. Each subject first received detailed instructions about the task and the importance of thinking aloud while responding to the problems. Before starting the actual task, subjects were given one problem to practice thinking aloud while being recorded. As in the previous studies, the unique good and unique bad pairs were balanced across choice problems and subjects.
The task included the four problems used in studies 1 and 2. Because the decision process underlying the results of the two studies was expected to be similar, only the scenario from study 1 was used. The protocols were analyzed by two judges, including one of the authors, who counted the number of features expressed about the two alternatives by the subjects for each choice problem in each choice context. Next, these thoughts were linked with unique or common features of the two alternatives. A thought such as ' 'Both have good party spots'' counted as a favorable thought for both alternatives. The interjudge reliability was 94 percent, and disagreements were resolved by discussion. To test the effect of context on differential focus, we compared the number of common and unique features mentioned in the process of deciding from the choice sets with unique good and unique bad pairs. We also examined the number of unique and common features mentioned for the choosers and nonchoosers for the unique good and unique bad pairs separately.
Results and Discussion
The effect of the choice-set manipulation on the preference for a no-choice option replicated the results of the previous studies. There was a statistically significant increase in the no-choice share for the unique bad pairs (14 percent in the automobile problem, 16 percent in the vacation problem, 20 percent in the blind-date problem, and 14 percent in the work-partner problem). Table 3 reports the mean number of thoughts for the unique and common features for the two choice contexts. In the four choice problems, the number of thoughts about the unique features was significantly greater than the number of thoughts about the common features (3.4 vs. 1.1, z = 5.7, p < .01). This finding is consistent with the premise that subjects focus their attention on the unique features. Moreover, negative features were more likely to be mentioned than positive features, both when such features were unique (3.9 vs. 2.8, z = 2.9, p < .01) and when they were common (1.5 vs. 0.8, z = 1.7, p < .10).
We also examined the differences between choosers and nonchoosers in each choice context. When the choice set consisted of unique good pairs, subjects selecting the no-choice option mentioned fewer unique features (2.4 vs. 3.2, z = 1.9, /? < .01) than subjects who made a choice. In contrast, subjects who preferred not to choose from unique bad pairs mentionecl more unique features (4.4 vs. 3.2, z = 3.1, p < .01) than subjects who did make a choice. Thus, subjects who acted most in accordance with the underweighting of common features were most likely to exhibit the predicted choice behavior. This is further highlighted in the ratio of unique to common features that were stated by the choosers and nonchoosers in the two choice contexts as shown in the note to Table 3 .
STUDY 4 Choice and Preference for Uniqueness
As stated earlier, the feature comparison process for choosing differs from a process in which the two alternatives are separately evaluated and then these evaluations are compared. The notion of shared and unique features has meaning only in the context of a direct comparison of the choice alternatives. The previous studies used the choice context to highlight either the good or the bad features of the alternatives in the choice set. The focus led to an increase (for unique good pairs) or a decrease (for unique bad pairs) in the attractiveness of the choice set as a whole. Not only can the choice context affect the attractiveness of the choice set as a whole; it can also affect the attractiveness of any single alternative in that set. To the extent that the context highlights the good features of a particular alternative (and downplays its bad features), there should be an increase in its relative attractiveness for the reasons described previously.
Consider the choice between two vacation spots, both of which have different good and different bad features. Now a third alternative is added, an alternative whose good features are the same as the good features of one of the other two alternatives in the choice set. This creates a perception of relative uniqueness for the alternative with different good features, which in itself may increase its relative attractiveness. In addition, the alternative that NOTE.-Data are presented as tnean nutnber of thoughts. For the unique good pairs, the ratio of unique to common features stated were as foilows: for choosers, 3.5; for nonchoosers, 1.2; ail artifacts, 1.8. For the unique bad pairs, the ratio of unique to connmon features stated were as foiiows: for choosers, 3.2; for nonchoosers, 6.2; ail artifacts, 4.9. For the unique good pairs, 54 percent of subjects tnade a choice, and 46 percent made no choice. For the unique bad pairs, 38 percent made a choice, and 62 percent made no choice (difference between conditions, p = .01).
shares its bad features with the new alternative makes them less salient. On the basis of this discussion, we propose the following hypothesis.
H4: The relative preference for an alternative can be increased by introducing a new alternative that makes its good features appear unique and its bad features appear common.
Method
Procedure. The subjects were 220 students at a northeastern university, and they were each paid $2.00 for their participation. The task and instructions were the same as in previous studies. A between-subjects design was used, with the three conditions differing in the composition of the choice set. In the control condition, subjects saw a choice set in which the two alternatives had different good and different bad features (Gl-Bl and G2-B2). In a second condition, a third alternative, C (G2-B1), which had the same good features as the second alternative and the same bad features as the first alternative, was added to the choice set. This made the good features of the first alternative and the bad features of the second relatively unique. Thus, the first alternative should gain in attractiveness. In the third condition, the new alternative, C" (G1-B2), highlighted the good features of the second alternative and downplayed its bad features and highlighted the bad features and downplayed the good features of the first alternative. This should lead to an increase in the attractiveness of the second alternative. Each subject made decisions for four choice problems in one of the three treatment conditions. Subjects were randomly assigned to the three conditions, and the order of the problems was randomly determined.
Stimulus Material. The choice problems were the same as in previous studies. Two sets of unique good and bad features were used to construct the control choice set. A combination of these features was used to construct the third alternative in the two treatment conditions. In order to maximize the effect of feature distinctiveness, the new alternative had the effect of making the good features more unique as well as making the bad features more common. An example of the stimulus materials for the vacation problem that highlights the unique good features of the first alternative and the unique bad features of the second alternative is shown in Appendix B.
Results
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the relative preference for an alternative will be greater when it is perceived to have unique good features among the set of alternatives under consideration. Suppose that C' shares good features with B and bad features with A, and C shares good features with A and bad features with B. The focus on unique features predicts that the addition of C to the set [A,B} will increase the attractiveness of A relative to B. The same reasoning leads to the prediction that the addition of C" to the set [A,B} will increase the attractiveness of B relative to A. Let P(A,-B) be the proportion of consumers who chose A from the choice set [A,B), and let P(A;B,C') and P(A;6,C") be the proportions of consumers who chose A from the set {A,B,C'} and {A,B,C"}, respectively.
Using the measure developed by Simonson and Tversky (1992) , Pc'(A,fi) measures the popularity of A relative to B, inferred from the choice set {A,B,C'). The preference for uniqueness implies that Pc'(A,fi) > Pc'(A;fi). We predict that the relative preference for the alternative whose good features are' perceived as unique will increase in that triple in relation to the other triple as well as the pairwise coniparison. The results are presented in Table  4 Choose A Choose 6 Choose C or C" Problem 2: apartment:
Choose A Choose 6 Choose C Problem 3: blind date:
Choose A Choose S Choose C orC" Problem 4: work partner of the same sex:
Choose A Choose S Choose C or C" n (220 total)
A, G1-B1 B, G2-B2 preference for A over B in the triple [A,B,C"} decreased to 33 percent in the triple that made B's good features look more unique. The difference in the relative preference of A over B between the two triples was 25 percent (z = 3.1, p < .01). Across the four problems, the relative preference for A over B increased by 10 percent when A's good features appeared unique and decreased by 8 percent when B's good features appeared more unique. The difference between Pc'(A,-fi) and Pc (A;B) was 18 percent (z = 5.9, p < .01). Thus, the data support the notion that the attractiveness of an alternative can be enhanced if the choice context makes its good features appear relatively unique and its bad features appear common in comparison with those of other alternatives in the choice set.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current set of studies achieves several goals. Previous research has shown that a focus on the features that are unique to the alternatives has effects on the amount of time it takes to choose (Houston et al. 1991 ) and on the overall satisfaction with the choice and the evaluations of the chosen and rejected alternatives (Houston and Sherman 1995) . Our research adds to these effects in several ways. Study 1 showed that the preference for not choosing any of the available alternatives was greater for unique bad than for unique good paits. Study 2 extended this finding to subjects' greater willingness to switch to a new alternative after an initial choice from unique bad rather than unique good pairs. These results extend the effect of feature distinctiveness to the emerging domain of contextual infiuence on choice incidence. Study 4 also supported the effect by showing that the addition of a third alternative can alter the relative preference for the other two alternatives in ways thait are predictable from the salience of unique features.
An important implication of these outcomes is that the evaluation of the choice set and of the individual items in the choice set will vary depending on the context provided by the items in the choice set. Thus, the very same item can be evaluated quite differently depending on the other items that are present in the choice set. The idea that the evaluation or judgment of an item can vary as a function of the background context is not recent. Context effects in judgment and choice have been a focus of study for many years (e.g., Helson 1964; Simonson and Tversky 1992 ). An underlying theme of these findings is that the preference for a particular alternative can be enhanced or diminished depending on whether the nature of trade-off contrast is favorable or unfavorable to that option. These context effects are posited to occur because of the great differences in value along the relevant dimension of the different stimulus sets.
The process involved, based on the focus on unique features, is quite different from other processes that have been used to account for the effects of adding new altematives. Although the judgment of a target stimulus is different depending on the set of altematives in which this stimulus is embedded, the different choice sets do not differ in value. The same item (e.g., an apartment) is evaluated differently in the context of two different but equally attractive apartments. In other words, the different contexts do not differ along the evaluative dimension. Rather, the comparison process that is engaged in by the decision maker leads to an underweighting of some features of the altematives and a heightened salience of other features. Thus, context effects can be brought about not only by the perspective provided by the set of relevant items but also by the set of relevant features that are considered.
Not only do the present studies demonstrate such context effects, but additional evidence for the focus process was provided in study 3. Think-aloud protocols demonstrated that subjects focused their attention on the unique features of the available altematives. In addition, the degree to which subjects chose an available option as opposed to seeking to look further was predictable from the features that were focused on, as indicated by the thinkaloud protocols. This evidence regarding the processes underlying differences in preferences and satisfaction is an important step.
Study 4 shows that the addition of a new, third alternative can affect the relative preference of the two other alternatives. Much work in the judgment and decisionmaking literature has been devoted to an understanding of how new entries into a market will affect the market share of other alternatives. A number of different context effects in consumer choice, such as the attraction and the compromise effects, have been identified in the literature (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982; Simonson and Tversky 1992) . The process involved, based on the focus on unique features, is quite different from other processes that have been used to account for the effects of adding new altematives. The effects in study 4 depended on which of the features of the altematives were rendered unique or shared by the addition of a new option. Once again, these results indicate that it is not the objective values of the altematives taken independently that contribute to preference; rather, it is the comparison process engaged by the preference task that brings about these effects. The same item can be chosen and valued highly, chosen and valued very little, rejected and valued highly, or rejected and valued very little depending on the features of the other altematives in the choice set.
Marketing Consequences
Our findings suggest that marketers can affect consumer preferences by manipulating the choice set of competing alternatives. Because few products achieve complete dominance in the marketplace, the choice of product comparisons also implicitly determines the nature of the trade-offs that consumers are asked to make in order to choose. In particular, when designing comparative ads, marketers could encourage consumers to consider the different advantages of their product in relation to those of competitors rather than the disadvantages of competitors' products in relation to their product. For instance, advertising wars that provide reasons for not buying competitors' products may prove counterproductive and result in consumers' not purchasing at all. This would further reinforce findings that negative comparative advertising may be inferior to positive comparative advertising in terms of claim acceptance (Jain 1993) by showing its effect on choice. In a similar vein, the effect that negative campaigning may have on voter turnout would be an interesting topic for future research.
The finding that an option that has relatively unique good features tends to appear more attractive and to have a higher choice probability provides another reason to construct the context carefully when comparative advertising is used. Specifically, the present results suggest how the context can be used to create perceived uniqueness and favorable associations for a specific alternative. Consider the case in which a prospective student has to decide among different types of educational institutions. We suggest that if a small liberal arts college compares itself to Ivy League institutions that have similar benefits (i.e., faculty reputation, breadth of courses, student diversity), it should make itself relatively more attractive by highlighting the unique benefits of the smaller college. More generally, marketers should take this effect into consideration when presenting various comparable alternatives. Just as previous research has shown that differentiation based on a unique, but irrelevant, attribute can increase the attractiveness of the differentiated brand (Carpenter, Glazer, and Nakamoto 1994) , our results suggest that perceptions of uniqueness can be created by the decision context.
Future Research Directions
Most of the work to date with regard to the featurematching model of choice has focused on whether the presence of unique good or bad features and the enhancement of the distinctiveness of good or bad features affect the choice made from a set of alternatives and the level of satisfaction with that choice. This work can be characterized as primarily answering "is" questions (Zanna and Fazio 1982) . Is there an effect of the manipulation? Is there a phenomenon to be explained? Research indeed demonstrates that the presence and salience of unique features have interesting and significant effects on choice.
Now that these first-generation "is" questions have been asked and answered, it is time to move on to the next generation of questions: "when" and "how" questions. With regard to "when" questions, it will be important to investigate the limiting conditions of the effects and the preconditions under which these effects obtain. For example, given that the focus on unique features is basically a heuristic approach to making choices (in that not all of the features of all the candidates are considered), the effect is likely to be weaker when the common features are important or selfrelevant. In that case, one might want to give full and careful consideration to all known attributes. Similarly, the effect of common features may be moderated by the importance of the unique features of the altematives. In this vein, Chemev (1995) reports that when one of the unique features is perceived to have primary importance, common features enhance the polarization of consumer preferences, leading to a divergence of relative choice shares.
In addition, the effect may hold only when there are a few altematives. With larger numbers of alternatives, the identification of common and unique features is unwieldy, and an approach such as elimination by aspects might be adopted until the choice set is small enough to allow feature matching. Similarly, the effect may also weaken when there is an increase in the number of common features relative to the unique features. Finally, an issue that is pertinent to all context effects in choice is whether these effects weaken when subjects are asked to make repeated choices.
With regard to ' 'how'' questions, we must advance our understanding of the psychological processes underlying the observed effects. There have been few studies in which indicators of process have been collected. Exceptions are the response-time results reported by Houston et al. (1991) and the think-aloud protocol data reported in our study 3. Other kinds of processing data would be important for answering "how" questions. For example, the use of Mouselab decision software to examine data conceming information that subjects actively seek out in these choice situations could be extremely useful.
In sum, the present set of studies accomplishes several goals. First, implications of feature distinctiveness have been extended to an analysis of choice incidence, and the think-aloud protocols serve as a beginning for data that provide empirical support for the process outlined. The effect was shown to support predictions conceming the decision to forgo making a choice, the willingness to switch to a new altemative after an initial choice, and the effect of adding a third alternative on the preferences for the two other altematives. Finally, implications for modeling consumer choice and for the effects of productfeature evolution in markets have been specified. Future research will test and expand on these implications. 
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